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3 WE LIVE IN A WORLD OF MULTIPLE OVERLAPPING normative communities. For example, I am typ-ing these words in a house in Massachusetts, 
although I am a resident of Maryland, who works in Washington, DC. 
Thus, Massachusetts state law may govern some of my activities, while 
Maryland law or DC law may be relevant to other aspects of my life. And 
in Massachusetts, Maryland, and DC I am also located within a variety of 
political sub- divisions, such as towns, cities, counties, wards, neighborhood 
districts, water regions, and so on, each of which may have normative 
authority over me. Federal law governs many aspects of my life as well, 
from the speed limits on the interstate highways to certain environmental 
standards affecting the air and water, to the individual liberties the U.S. 
Constitution protects. International law may be the source of additional 
rights or protections, ranging from standards for trade, technology, and 
the use of satellites to the frameworks for regulating the environment, 
consumer product labeling, and the conduct of war. And certainly if I 
travel abroad or surf Internet sites based overseas or enter into contracts 
with foreign entities I will run up against international and transnational 
legal norms. 
 But these governmental normative communities are just the tip of 
the iceberg. Nonstate communities may also impose signifi cant norma-
tive force. For example, if I think someone is violating the copyright of 
this book, I may use international arbitration sanctioned by the World 
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Intellectual Property Organization, a nongovernmental entity. If Web 
searches for my book do not place my Web page high enough on the list, I 
may need to challenge Google’s search indexing protocols. And I am gov-
erned (or at least strongly infl uenced) by tenure rules at my university, 
religious rules of my faith (if I am a believer), American Bar Association 
rules regarding the conduct of law school classrooms, the metrics used 
by  US News & World Report when it ranks law schools, and simply the 
practices and customs of the academic community of which I am a part. 
And on and on. 
 This book seeks to grapple with the complexities of law in a world 
where a single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple legal or 
quasi-legal regimes. Law often operates based on a convenient fi ction 
that nation-states exist in autonomous, territorially distinct spheres 
and that activities therefore fall under the legal jurisdiction of only one 
regime at a time. Thus, traditional legal rules have tied jurisdiction to 
territory: a state could exercise complete authority within its territorial 
borders and no authority beyond it. In the twentieth century, such rules 
were loosened, but territorial location remained the principal touch-
stone for assigning legal authority. Accordingly, if one could spatially 
ground a dispute, one could most likely determine the legal rule that 
would apply. 
 But consider such a system in today’s world. Should the U.S. govern-
ment be able to sidestep the U.S. Constitution when it houses prisoners in 
“offshore” detention facilities in Guant á namo Bay or elsewhere around 
the world? Should spatially distant corporations that create serious local 
harms be able to escape local legal regulation simply because they are 
not physically located in the jurisdiction? When the U.S. government 
seeks to shut down the computer of a hacker located in Russia, does 
the virus transmitted constitute an act of war or a violation of Russia’s 
 sovereignty? Does it make sense to think that satellite transmissions, 
online interactions, and complex fi nancial transactions have any territo-
rial locus at all? How can we best understand the complex relationships 
among international, regional, national, and subnational legal systems? 
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And in a world where nonstate actors such as industry standard-setting 
bodies, nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions, ethnic 
groups, terrorist networks, and others exert signifi cant normative pull, 
can we build a suffi ciently capacious understanding of the very idea of 
jurisdiction to address the incredible array of overlapping authorities 
that are our daily reality? 
 Thus, a simple model that looks only to territorial delineations among 
offi cial state-based legal systems is now simply untenable (if it was ever 
useful to begin with). Thankfully, debates about globalization have moved 
beyond the polarizing question of whether the nation-state is dying or 
not. But one does not need to believe in the death of the nation-state 
to recognize both that physical location can no longer be the sole crite-
rion for conceptualizing legal authority and that nation-states must work 
within a framework of multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions by 
state, international, and even nonstate communities. Each of these types 
of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a potentially hybrid legal 
space that is not easily eliminated. 
 With regard to confl icts between and among states, the growth of 
global communications technologies, the rise of multinational corporate 
entities with no signifi cant territorial center of gravity, and the mobility 
of capital and people across borders mean that many jurisdictions will 
feel effects of activities around the globe, leading inevitably to multiple 
assertions of legal authority over the same act, without regard to ter-
ritorial location. For example, in 2000 a French court asserted jurisdic-
tion over the U.S.-based web portal Yahoo! because French users could 
download Nazi memorabilia and Holocaust denial material via Yahoo!’s 
auction sites, in violation of French law. 1 Yahoo! argued in response that 
the French assertion of jurisdiction was impermissibly extraterritorial 
in scope because Yahoo!, as a U.S. corporation transmitting material 
  1  Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 
22, 2000, Ordonnance de r é f é r é ,  UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France ,  available 
at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm. 
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uploaded in the United States, was protected by the First Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 2 Yet, the extraterritoriality charge runs in both 
directions. If France is  not able to block the access of French citizens to 
proscribed material, then the United States will effectively be imposing 
First Amendment norms on the entire world. And whatever the solu-
tion to this problem might be, a territorial analysis will not help because 
the relevant transaction is both “in” France and not “in” France simulta-
neously. Cross-border environmental, 3 trade, 4 intellectual property, 5 and 
tax regulation 6 raise similar issues. 
 The problem of multiple states’ asserting jurisdiction over the same 
activity is just the beginning, however, because nation-states must 
also often share legal authority with one or more international and 
regional courts, tribunals, or regulatory entities. Indeed, the Project on 
International Courts and Tribunals has identifi ed approximately 125 
international institutions, all issuing decisions that have some effect on 
state legal authority, 7 though those decisions are sometimes deemed 
binding, sometimes merely persuasive, and often fall somewhere between 
the two. For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and other similar agreements, special panels can pass judgment 
  2  Id. 
  3  See, e.g. ,  Transboundary Harm in  International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006); Philippe Sands, 
Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law,  33 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 527 (2001). 
  4  See, e.g. , Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the 
Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Confl ict, 12  Geo. Int’l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
  5  See, e.g. ,  Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 
617 (4th Cir. 2003);  GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 
(E.D. Va. 2003); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts 
Should Create Global Norms, 149  U. Pa. L. Rev. 469 (2000). 
  6  See, e.g. , Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151  U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 
334–7 (2002). 
  7  See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, The International Judiciary in 
Context (2004),  available at  http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synoptic _chart/
Synop_C4.pdf. 
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on whether domestic legal proceedings have provided fair process. 8 And 
though the panels cannot directly review or overturn local rulings, they 
can levy fi nes against the federal government signatories of the agree-
ment, thereby undermining the impact of the local judgment. 9 Thus, now 
that a NAFTA tribunal has ruled that the conduct of a Mississippi trial 
against a Canadian corporation “was so fl awed that it constituted a mis-
carriage of justice amounting to manifest injustice as that expression 
is understood in international law,” 10 it is an open question as to how 
Mississippi courts will rule in future cases involving foreign defendants. 11 
Meanwhile, in the realm of human rights, we have seen criminal defen-
dants convicted in state courts in the United States proceed (through 
their governments) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to argue 
that they were denied the right to contact their consulate, as required by 
treaty. 12 Again, although the ICJ judgments are technically unenforceable 
in the United States, at least one state court followed the ICJ’s command 
anyway. 13 Meanwhile, outside these more formal adjudicative processes, 
there are many powerful transnational networks of governmental regula-
tors setting a kind of international policy as a de facto matter over much 
of the global fi nancial system, among other areas. 14 
 Finally, nonstate legal (or quasi-legal) norms add to this pluralism of 
authority. Given increased migration and global communication, it is not 
  8  See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 7–17, 1992, art. 1135, 
32 I.L.M. 605, 646. 
  9  Id. 
  10  Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States , ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (June 
26, 2003) (Final Merits Award), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003),  also available at http://
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Loewen/LoewenFinalAward.pdf. Publicly released 
documents on all NAFTA disputes are  available at http://www.naftalaw.org. 
  11  See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review 
of National Courts, 79  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2029 (2004) (discussing case). 
  12  See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12. 
  13  See Torres v. State , No. PCD-04–442, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) 
(granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing). 
  14  See, e.g. , David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46  Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 563 (2008); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in 
International Administration, 5  Chi. J. Int’l L. 547 (2005). 
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surprising that people feel ties to, and act on the basis of affi liations with, 
multiple communities in addition to their territorial ones. Such commu-
nities may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic; transnational, subnational, 
or international; and the norms asserted by such communities frequently 
challenge territorially based authority. Indeed, canon law and other reli-
gious community norms have long operated in signifi cant overlap with 
state law. And in the Middle East and elsewhere, confl icts between a per-
sonal law tied to religion and a territorial law tied to the nation-state con-
tinue to pose constitutional and other challenges. 15 Bonds of ethnicity can 
also create signifi cant normative communities. For example, some com-
mentators advocate regimes that give ethnic minorities limited autonomy 
within larger nation-states. 16 Transnationally, when members of an ethnic 
diaspora purchase securities issued by their “home” country, one might 
argue that, regardless of where, territorially, the bonds are purchased, the 
transactions should be governed by the law of the “homeland.” 17 Finally, 
we see communities of transnational bankers and accountants develop-
ing their own regulatory regimes governing trade fi nance 18 or accounting 
standards, 19 as well as the use of modern forms of lex mercatoria 20 to 
  15  See, e.g. , Chibli Mallat, On the Specifi city of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38  Case 
W. Res. J. Int’l L. 13, 47–55 (2006). 
  16  See, e.g. , Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy 
Regimes for Minorities, 66  Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539, 1541–2 (1991) (identifying three 
different types of autonomy regimes for ethnic minorities). 
  17  See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1005, 1060–74 (2001) (describ-
ing debt instruments offered by the Indian government to raise capital principally from 
its diaspora). 
  18  See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale 
of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30  Yale J. Int’l L. 125 (2005). 
  19  For example, the International Accounting Standards Board is an independent, not-for-
profi t organization that seeks “to develop a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable and globally accepted international fi nancial reporting standards.” IFRS 
Foundation, About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB,  available at http://www.ifrs.org/
The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm. 
  20  See, e.g. , Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design 
and International Usages Under the CISG, 5  Chi. J. Int’l L. 157, 159 (2004) (noting 
that the Convention “explicitly incorporates trade usages into contracts that it governs, 
permits usages to trump confl icting [Convention] provisions, and authorizes courts to 
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govern business relations. 21 Such nonstate legal systems often infl uence 
(or are incorporated in) state or international regimes. 22 
 These spheres of complex overlapping legal authority are, not sur-
prisingly, sites of confl ict and confusion. In response to this hybrid reality, 
communities might seek to “solve” such confl icts either by reimposing the 
primacy of territorially based (and often nation-state-based) authority or 
by seeking universal harmonization. Thus, on the one hand, communities 
may try to seal themselves off from outside infl uence, either by retreating 
from the rest of the world and becoming more insular (as many religious 
groups seek to do), by building walls either literal or regulatory to pro-
tect the community from outsiders, by taking measures to limit outside 
infl uence (U.S. legislation seeking to discipline judges for citing foreign or 
international law is but one prominent example), or by falling back on ter-
ritorially based jurisdiction or choice-of-law rules. At the other extreme, 
we see calls for harmonization of norms, more  treaties, the construction of 
international governing bodies, and the creation of “world law.” 
interpret and complete contracts by reference to usages”).  But see Celia Wasserstein 
Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria – Hoist with Its Own Petard? 5  Chi. J. Int’l L. 67 (2004) (argu-
ing that the modern revival of lex mercatoria departs signifi cantly from the historical 
conception). 
  21  See, e.g. , Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private 
Legal Systems, 22  Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (2004) (using game theory to argue that the exist-
ence of preexisting networks enhances a private legal system’s ability to enforce norms); 
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21  J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992) (discussing the system of “private law-
making” in the New York Diamond Dealers Club); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial 
Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 
99  Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001) (describing the nonstate legal system used to govern com-
mercial transactions in the cotton industry); Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and 
Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 94  Cal. L. Rev. 313 (2006) (discussing a “Tuna 
Court” in Japan that adjudicates disputes about sale prices in a tuna market). 
  22  See, e.g. , Levit,  supra note 18, at 165 (describing ways in which formal lawmaking insti-
tutions such as the World Trade Organization have, over time, appropriated nonstate 
trade fi nance norms into their offi cial legal instruments).  See generally Carol Weisbrod, 
Fusion Folk: A Comment on Law and Music, 20  Cardozo L. Rev. 1439 (1999) (using the 
incorporation of folk music into “high culture” classical compositions as a metaphor for 
understanding the relationship between state and nonstate law). 
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 I argue that we should be wary of pinning our hopes on legal regimes 
that rely either on reimposing sovereigntist 23 territorial insularity or 
on striving for universals. Not only are such strategies sometimes nor-
matively undesirable, but more fundamentally they simply will not be 
successful in many circumstances. As I will address in more detail, the 
infl uence and application of foreign norms or foreign decision-making 
bodies may be useful and productive, but in any event they are inevitable 
and cannot be willed away by fi at. 
 Therefore, I suggest an alternative response to legal hybridity:  we 
might deliberately seek to create or preserve spaces for productive inter-
action among multiple, overlapping legal systems by developing proce-
dural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to manage, without 
eliminating, the legal pluralism we see around us . Such mechanisms, insti-
tutions, and practices can help mediate confl icts by recognizing that mul-
tiple communities may legitimately wish to assert their norms over a 
given act or actor, by seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and 
by deferring to alternative approaches if possible. And even when a deci-
sion maker cannot defer to an alternative norm (because some assertions 
of norms are repressive, violent, and/or profoundly illiberal), procedures 
for managing pluralism can at least require an explanation of why defer-
ence is impossible. 
 The excruciatingly diffi cult case-by-case questions concerning how 
much to defer to another normative community and how much to impose 
the norms of one’s own community are probably impossible to answer 
defi nitively. The crucial antecedent point, however, is that although peo-
ple may never reach agreement on norms, they may at least acquiesce 
in procedural mechanisms, institutions, or practices that take pluralism 
seriously, rather than ignoring it through assertions of territorially based 
power or dissolving it through universalist imperatives. Processes for man-
aging pluralism seek to preserve spaces of opportunity for contestation 
  23  I borrow the term “sovereigntist” from Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American 
Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets,  Foreign Affairs 9–15 (Nov./Dec. 2000). 
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and local variation. Accordingly, a focus on hybridity may at times be 
both normatively preferable and more practical precisely because agree-
ment on substantive norms is so diffi cult. And again, the claim is only that 
the independent values of pluralism should always be factored into the 
analysis, not that they should never be trumped by other considerations. 
 Of course, even if pluralist institutions and processes better refl ect 
the complexity of the world around us, that is not necessarily a reason 
to adopt them. Yet, we may fi nd that the added norms, viewpoints, and 
participants produce better decision making, better adherence to those 
decisions by participants and nonparticipants alike, and ultimately better 
real-world outcomes. And while this may not always be so, the essential 
point is that in the design of procedures, institutions, and discursive prac-
tices these possible benefi ts need to be considered. 
 This alternative jurisprudence I propose is fundamentally both  cos-
mopolitan and  pluralist . Thus, I should take a moment at the outset to 
explain what I mean by both terms. This is particularly important because 
in political and scholarly discourse these terms are often subject to vary-
ing uses, meanings, and connotations. 
 By cosmopolitan, I mean to invoke a framework recognizing that we 
are all fundamentally members of multiple communities, both local and 
global, territorial and epistemic. Unfortunately, many confl ate cosmopol-
itanism with universalism. 24 Yet cosmopolitanism does not require a 
belief in a single global welfare or even a single universal set of governing 
norms; nor does it necessarily require that global welfare trump state or 
local welfare. Instead, cosmopolitanism is a useful trope for conceptual-
izing the current period of interaction across territorial borders precisely 
  24  See, e.g. , Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56  Fla. L. Rev. 867, 879 (2004) 
(“Rather than aspiring to  universal cosmopolitanism , statelessness may well foster rever-
sion to a selfi sh individualism.”) (emphasis added);  see also Bruce Ackerman, Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism, 104  Ethics 516, 534 (1994) (“If I were a European right now, I hope 
I would have the guts to stand up for rootless cosmopolitanism: forget this nationalistic 
claptrap, and let us build a world worthy of free and equal human beings.”); Anupam 
Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1005, 1046 (2001) (“The cosmopolitan 
model . . . dissolves the multirootedness of diasporas into a global identity.”). 
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because it recognizes that people have multiple affi liations, extending 
from the local to the global (and many nonterritorial affi liations as well). 
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international citi-
zenship in the sense of international harmonization and standardization, 
but is instead a recognition of multiple refracted differences where peo-
ple acknowledge links with the “other” without demanding either assim-
ilation or ostracism. 
 Pluralism goes even further and recognizes that our conception of law 
must include more than just offi cially sanctioned governmental edicts or 
formal court documents. As discussed previously, many different non-
state communities assert various forms of jurisdiction and impose all 
kinds of normative demands. Moreover, people often feel themselves to 
be bound by such entities, regardless of the formal status of those entities. 
Indeed, legal pluralists have long noted that law does not reside solely in 
the coercive commands of a sovereign power. 25 Rather, law is constantly 
  25  See, e.g. , Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classifi cations, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in  Law 
and the Social Sciences 11, 15 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (“[N]ot 
all the phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their source in 
 government.”). For further discussions of legal pluralism,  see Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann, Transnational Dimensions of Legal Pluralism, in  Begegnung und Konfl ikt: 
eine kulturanthropologische Bestandsaufnahme 33, 33–48 (2001); Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos,  Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 
(William Twinning & Christopher McCrudden eds., 2d ed., 2002);  Law and Globalization 
from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C é sar 
A. Rodr í guez-Garavito eds., 2005); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal 
Pluralism in the World Society, in  Global Law Without a State 3–28 (Gunther Teubner 
ed., 1997); Carol Weisbrod,  Emblems of Pluralism: Cultural Differences and the State 
(2002); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism? 47  J. Legal 
Pluralism & Unoffi cial L. 37 (2002); David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American 
Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 5  Am. B. Found. Res. J. 425 (1980); 
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 
19  J. Legal Pluralism 1, 28–34 (1981); John Griffi ths, What Is Legal Pluralism? 24  J. 
Legal Pluralism & Unoffi cial L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22  Law & 
Soc’y Rev. 869, 870 (1988) [hereinafter Merry, Legal Pluralism]; Sally Falk Moore, Law 
and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study, 7  Law. & Soc’y Rev. 719 (1973) [hereinafter Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization 
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constructed through the contest of these various norm-generating 
 communities. 26 Thus, although “offi cial” norms articulated by sovereign 
entities obviously count as “law,” such offi cial assertions of prescriptive 
or adjudicatory jurisdiction are only some of the many ways in which 
normative commitments arise. 
 Moreover, legal pluralists have sought to document hybrid legal 
spaces, where more than one legal, or quasi-legal, regime occupies the 
same social fi eld. 27 Historically, such sites were most prominently associ-
ated either with colonialism – where the legal system imposed by empire 
was layered on top of indigenous legal systems 28 – or the study of reli-
gion – where, as noted previously, canon law and other spiritual codes 
have often existed in an uneasy relationship with the state legal system. 29 
and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 
 Leiden J. Int’l L. 345 (2005) (U.K.); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version 
of Legal Pluralism, 27  J.L. & Soc’y 296 (2000); Sally Engle Merry,  International Law 
and Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism (Studies in Law, 
Politics, & Society, Vol. 41 Austin Sarat ed., 2007). 
  26  See Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, 
97  Harv. L. Rev. 4, 43 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (“The  position 
that only the state creates law . . . confuses the status of interpretation with the sta-
tus of political domination.”);  see also Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales 
of Jurisdiction, in  Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover 173, 
176 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds., 1992)(“[A]ll collective behav-
ior entailing systematic understandings of our commitments to future worlds [can 
lay] equal claim to the word ‘law.’”) (alterations in original); Perry Dane, The Maps of 
Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12  Cardozo L. Rev. 959, 963–4 (1991) (“This Article belongs 
to a body of legal scholarship that refuses to limit the domain of law to the law of the 
state.”). 
  27  See Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social Field,  supra note 25, at 720. 
  28  See, e.g. , Leopold Pospisil, Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in New 
Guinea, 19  J. Legal Pluralism 93 (1981). 
  29  See, e.g. , Carol Weisbrod,  The Boundaries of Utopia (1980) (examining the contrac-
tual underpinnings of four nineteenth-century American religious utopian commu-
nities: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar). As Marc Galanter has 
observed, the fi eld of church and state is the “locus classicus of thinking about the mul-
tiplicity of normative orders.” Galanter,  supra note 25, at 28;  see also Carol Weisbrod, 
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 
 J. Fam. L. 741 (1988) (analyzing church-state relations in the United States from a plu-
ralist perspective). 
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Legal pluralists explored the myriad ways that overlapping legal systems 
interact with each other and observed that the very existence of multiple 
systems can at times create openings for contestation, resistance, and cre-
ative adaptation. 30 
 In this book, I apply a cosmopolitan pluralist framework to the global 
arena and argue that this framework is essential if we are to more com-
prehensively conceptualize a world of hybrid legal spaces. This approach, 
I realize, is unlikely to be fully satisfying either to committed nation-
state sovereigntists or to committed universalists. Indeed, these poles in 
some ways echo those that Martii Koskenniemi famously identifi ed as 
the irreconcilable positions inherent in all international legal argument. 31 
Thus, sovereigntists will object to the idea that nation-states should 
ever take into account international, transnational, or nonstate norms. 32 
Universalists, for their part, will chafe at the idea that international norms 
should ever be subordinated to local practices that may be less liberal or 
less rights-protecting. And even hard-line pluralists will complain that a 
view focusing on how offi cial actors respond to hybridity is overly state-
centric. 
 All I can say to such objections is that if a perspective displeases 
everyone to some extent, it is, for that very reason, also likely to be a 
perspective that manages hybridity in the only way possible: by forging 
provisional compromises that fully satisfy no one but may at least gener-
ate grudging acquiescence. And, in a world of multiple norms, such pro-
visional compromises may ultimately be the best we can do. In any event, 
the central argument of this book is that hybridity is a reality we can-
not escape, and a pure sovereigntist or universalist position will often be 
unsustainable as a practical matter. Thus, cosmopolitan pluralism offers 
  30  See, e.g. , Merry, Legal Pluralism,  supra note 25, at 878 (noting room for resistance and 
autonomy within plural systems). 
  31  See Martii Koskenniemi,  From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (1989) (rev. ed. 2006). I am grateful to Duncan Hollis for identifying key 
points of contact between my argument and Koskenniemi’s. 
  32  In part, this objection is grounded in concerns about loss of democratic accountability 
and legitimacy. I address some of these concerns in Chapter 3. 
INTRODUCTION 15
both a more accurate descriptive account of the world we live in and a 
potentially useful alternative approach to the design of procedural mech-
anisms, institutions, and discursive practices. 
 Of course, one thing that a cosmopolitan pluralist approach will 
 not do is provide an authoritative metric for determining which norms 
should prevail in this messy hybrid world. Nor does it defi nitively answer 
the question of who gets to decide. Indeed, pluralism fundamentally chal-
lenges both positivist and natural rights–based assumptions that there 
can ever be a single answer to such questions. For example, as pluralists 
have documented in the colonial context, the state’s efforts to squelch 
a nonstate community are likely only to be partial, 33 and so the state’s 
assertion of its own trumping authority is not the end of the debate, but 
only one gambit in an ongoing normative discourse that has no fi nal 
 resolution. Likewise, there is no external position from which one could 
make a defi nitive statement as to who is authorized to make decisions in 
any given case. Rather, a statement of authority is itself inevitably open 
to contest. Power disparities matter, of course, and those who wield coer-
cive force may be able to silence competing voices for a time. But even 
that sort of temporary silencing is rarely the end of the story either. Thus, 
instead of the unitary answers assumed by both universalism and sov-
ereigntist territorialism, cosmopolitan pluralism provides a “jurisgenera-
tive” model 34 that focuses on the creative interventions made by various 
communities drawing on a variety of normative sources in ongoing polit-
ical, rhetorical, and legal iterations. 35 
  33  See, e.g. , Lauren Benton, Making Order out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the 
Spanish Colonial Borderlands, 26  Law & Soc. Inquiry 373, 375–6 (2001) (describing 
jurisdictional politics in seventeenth-century New Mexico and observing that, while 
“the crown made aggressive claims that royal authority and state law superseded other 
legal authorities,” in reality “[j]urisdictional disputes became not just commonplace but 
a defi ning feature of the legal order”). 
  34  See Cover, Nomos and Narrative,  supra note 26, at 11–15. 
  35  Cf. Seyla Benhabib,  Another Cosmopolitanism 49 (Robert Post, ed., 2006) 49 (2006) 
(“Whereas natural right philosophies assume that the principles that undergird demo-
cratic politics are impervious to transformative acts of popular collective will, and 
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM16
 Certainly individual communities may decide that their norms should 
trump those of others or that their norms are authoritative. So, for exam-
ple, a liberal democratic state might decide that certain illiberal commu-
nity practices are so beyond the pale that they cannot be countenanced, 
and therefore the state may invoke its authority to stifl e those practices. 
But a cosmopolitan pluralist approach recognizes that such statements 
of normative commitment and authority are themselves subject to dis-
pute. Accordingly, instead of clinging to the vain hope that unitary claims 
to authoritative law can ever be defi nitive, cosmopolitan pluralism rec-
ognizes the inevitability (if not always the desirability) of hybridity. 
Cosmopolitan pluralism is thus not a framework that dictates particular 
substantive outcomes. It observes that various actors pursue norms, and 
it studies the interplay, but it does not propose a hierarchy of substantive 
norms and values. 
 Nevertheless, while it does not offer  substantive norms, a cosmopol-
itan pluralist approach may favor  procedural mechanisms, institutions, 
and practices that provide opportunities for plural voices. Such proce-
dures can potentially help to channel (or even tame) normative confl ict 
to some degree by bringing multiple actors together into a shared social 
space. In addition, including multiple voices may lead to better substan-
tive outcomes because such multiplicity provides the possibility for cre-
ative alternatives that might otherwise not be heard. This cosmopolitan 
pluralist commitment can, of course, have strong normative implications 
because it asks decision makers and institutional designers at least to 
consider the independent value of pluralism. For example, as discussed 
in more detail later, we might favor a hybrid domestic-international tri-
bunal over either a fully domestic or a fully international one because it 
includes a more diverse range of actors, or we might favor complemen-
tarity or subsidiarity regimes because they encourage dialogue among 
whereas legal positivism identifi es democratic legitimacy with the correctly generated 
legal norms of a sovereign legislature, jurisgenerative politics is a model that permits us 
to think of creative interventions that mediate between universal norms and the will of 
democratic majorities.”). 
INTRODUCTION 17
multiple jurisdictions, and so on. And we might prefer confl ict of law 
frameworks that recognize the reality of hybridity rather than arbitrarily 
choosing a single governing legal regime to resolve problems implicating 
multiple communities. In any event, cosmopolitan pluralism questions 
whether a single world public order of the sort often contemplated by 
both nation-state sovereigntists and international law triumphalists is 
achievable, even assuming it were desirable. 
 At the same time, mechanisms, institutions, and practices of the sort 
discussed in this book require actors at least to be willing to take part in 
a common set of discursive forms. This is not as idealistic as it may at fi rst 
appear. As Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[t]he diffi culties of inter-cultural 
or religious-secular dialogue are often exaggerated when we talk about 
the incommensurability of cultural frameworks and the impossibility of 
conversation without a common conceptual scheme. In fact conversation 
between members of different cultural and religious communities is sel-
dom a dialogue of the deaf.” 36 Nevertheless, it is certainly true that some 
normative systems deny even this limited goal of mutual dialogue. Such 
systems would (correctly) recognize the liberal bias within the vision of 
procedural pluralism I explore here, 37 and they may reject the vision on 
that basis. For example, while abortion rights and antiabortion activists 
could, despite their differences, be said to share a willingness to engage in 
a common practice of constitutional adjudication, those bombing abor-
tion clinics are not similarly willing, and accordingly there may not be any 
way to accommodate such actors even within a more pluralist framework. 
Likewise, communities that refuse to allow even the participation of par-
ticular subgroups, such as women or minorities, may be diffi cult to include 
within the cosmopolitan pluralist vision I have in mind. Of course, these 
  36  Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and “Justifi cation” in the Courtroom, 1  J.L. Phil. & 
Culture 107, 112 (2007). 
  37  This is not to say that the vision of pluralism I explore should be taken as synonym-
ous with liberalism, though they share many attributes. Pluralism arguably assigns an 
independent value to dialogue among communities and an importance to community 
affi liation that is absent from (or at least less central to) liberal theory. 
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groups are undeniably important forces to recognize and take account of 
as a descriptive matter. But from a normative perspective, an embrace of 
a cosmopolitan pluralist jurisprudence need not commit one to a world-
view free from judgment, where all positions are equivalently embraced. 
Thus, I argue not necessarily for undifferentiated inclusion, but for a set 
of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that are more likely 
to expand the range of voices heard or considered, thereby creating more 
opportunities to forge a common social space than either sovereigntist 
territorialism or universalism. 38 In that sense, the vision I pursue here is 
at least partly indebted to the proceduralist vision of J ü rgen Habermas 39 
and can perhaps be embraced or criticized on similar grounds. 
 Chapter 2 begins by providing several illustrative examples of jur-
isdictional hybridity, where multiple legal norms of international, state, 
substate, and nonstate entities may overlap. I also introduce literature on 
legal pluralism and argue that pluralism provides a helpful framework 
for understanding a hybrid world where normative assertions of multiple 
entities – both state and nonstate – compete for primacy. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 then consider the two most common responses 
we see in the legal arena to the sort of hybridity described in Chapter 
2: sovereigntist territorialism and universalism. While each of these 
approaches may sometimes be deemed necessary and may sometimes 
be useful in addressing overlapping norms, I argue that they have serious 
 shortcomings. First, as a normative matter both sovereigntist territorial-
ism and universalism retreat from the potential benefi ts of cosmopolitan 
pluralism by limiting the range of norms considered and the range of 
voices at the table. This may be a problem in and of itself because enter-
taining  plural points of view within a procedural or institutional struc-
ture may carry independent benefi ts of inclusion, diversity, creativity, 
  38  This focus on jurisgenerative structure, rather than on the necessary inclusion of, or 
deference to, all points of view, may differentiate legal pluralism as I use it here from 
multiculturalism. 
  39  See generally Jürgen Habermas,  Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy (trans. William Rehg, 1996). 
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and dialogue that go beyond the outcome reached. And, of course, the 
 outcome reached may also ultimately be more creative and more effec-
tive because of the diversity of input. Second, even if one is dubious 
about the normative case for cosmopolitan pluralism, I argue that, as a 
descriptive matter, neither sovereigntist territorialism nor universalism 
will actually be a fully effective response to a world of legal assertions 
beyond borders, and therefore a broader and more fl exible framework 
will often be necessary simply to cope with the messy reality of law on 
the ground. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 lay out the core principles that undergird a cos-
mopolitan pluralist approach and then describe a variety of procedural 
mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive practices already at 
play in the world that take such an approach. Although each of these 
examples can be subjected to criticism on a variety of grounds, they do at 
least attempt to build structures that seek to manage, without eliminat-
ing, pluralism. 
 Finally, Chapters 7 through 9 address the knotty doctrines known in 
the United States as confl ict of laws, though sometimes referred to else-
where as private international law. These doctrines attempt to negotiate 
the interaction of communities by delineating jurisdictional boundaries, 
determining which communities’ norms should apply to multicommunity 
disputes, and analyzing the circumstances under which one community 
might enforce the judgment reached by another community. As such, these 
doctrines are potentially fundamental areas for employing a cosmopol-
itan pluralist frame to the legal negotiation of difference. Yet, too often 
confl ict of laws is relegated to a technocratic process of trying to forge 
rules that will clarify boundaries and render only one community or one 
set of norms legitimate or dominant. I argue instead that these doctrines 
should engage interdisciplinary scholars of law and globalization and 
that they offer a potential site for creative thinking about the interaction 
of norms. And, although as noted previously my aim throughout the book 
is to suggest a conceptual approach not to provide doctrinal answers, I do 
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offer a few illustrative examples of how each of these confl icts doctrines 
might be affected by a cosmopolitan pluralist framework. 
 One fi nal potential criticism of the book should perhaps be addressed 
at the outset. In the oft-discussed scholarly divide between “lumpers” 
and “splitters,” 40 I am clearly a “lumper.” That is, I offer here a highly syn-
thetic account that draws ties among a wide variety of different doctrines 
and lumps together a variety of different scholarly positions into broader 
categories. As such, I can rightly be criticized for eliding potentially 
important distinctions and grouping together phenomena or perspec-
tives that are quite different from each other. For example, I treat sov-
ereigntist territorialism as a single perspective, even though it represents 
a wide variety of positions, some of which focus more on nation-state 
sovereignty, while others focus more on territorial approaches to confl ict 
of laws, and so on. Yet, despite some obvious problems, I believe lumping 
nevertheless serves valuable purposes. By grouping together categories 
of thought and legal doctrines that are traditionally treated as distinct, we 
may be able to recognize broader patterns, make connections, and iden-
tify innovations that might otherwise have been opaque. Most import-
antly, while splitting is particularly useful for exploring fi ne distinctions 
with precision once a paradigm has been established, lumping can help 
foster the creative imaginings that make new paradigms possible. In any 
event, while both approaches are valuable and necessary, this book is 
dedicated to sparking broad-based creative thinking about a world of 
law beyond borders and therefore lumps concepts together, with all the 
advantages and disadvantages such an approach entails. 
 True to that lumping spirit, the book seeks to engage scholars from a 
wide variety of fi elds, including those in anthropology, sociology, cultural 
studies, international relations, and critical geography, as well as legal 
scholars studying Internet law, international business, trade and fi nance, 
  40  See George Gaylord Simpson, The Principles of Classifi cation and a Classifi cation 
of Mammals, 85  Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History 1, 23, (1945) 
(“Splitters [see] very small units . . . . Lumpers [see] only large units . . ..”) (alterations in 
original). 
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public international law, and confl ict of laws. I also hope to contribute to 
ongoing debates about the effi cacy of international law, changing struc-
tures of sovereignty, and cosmopolitan theory. I argue that rational choice 
understandings of how international law works or pure theory debates 
about sovereignty are limited because they focus too heavily on coercive 
power, thereby deemphasizing the role of rhetorical persuasion, informal 
articulations of legal norms, changes in legal consciousness, and networks 
of affi liation that may not possess literal enforcement power. Accordingly, 
my invocation of “law beyond borders” refers not only to the assertion of 
norms across territorial borders, but also the fact that legal articulations 
often function “beyond” the supposed conceptual  borders between law 
on the one hand and political rhetoric on the other. 41 And if, as discussed 
previously, cosmopolitanism is defi ned not as universalism but as an 
acknowledgment of multiple affi liation and a call for conversation across 
difference, then this book also explores law as a crucial potential site for 
cosmopolitan dialogue. 
 In all of this discussion, I emphasize a cultural analysis of law, which 
argues that law both refl ects and constructs social reality. This is, of course, 
not the only way of understanding how law operates. For example, one 
might think law is simply about constructing simple, easily defi ned rules 
that promote effi ciency and predictability, regardless of how they refl ect 
social reality. Yet, even if such an impulse is part of the web of ratio-
nales underlying legal rules, I believe it does not capture the rich reality 
of how law operates in relation to social life. Indeed, a simple formalist 
rule that fails to accord with social reality and lived experience tends 
to be replaced over time, fi rst by what are known as legal fi ctions and 
then by new legal norms. For example, as discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, very clear, simple nineteenth-century jurisdictional rules that 
depended on physical presence in a territorial location could not cope 
with the changed social reality wrought by advances in transportation 
  41  See Koskenniemi,  supra note 31, at 69 (“Before any meaningful attempt at reform . . . 
the idea of legal objectivity – and with it the conventional distinction between law, pol-
itics and morality (justice) needs to be rethought.”). 
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and communications technologies and the resulting shifts in how corpora-
tions and governments operated and how people increasingly lived their 
lives. Accordingly, those jurisdictional rules were altered, fi rst, through 
somewhat strained judicially created notions of what constitutes “pres-
ence” in a location and then by a completely new legal regime for con-
ceptualizing jurisdiction that shifted the focus away from simple physical 
presence. Thus, I start from the premise that social reality matters in legal 
discussions and that a more culturally based analytical framework should 
at least be an important part of our discussions of how to conceptualize 
law and globalization. 
 Ultimately, by studying the many local settings in which the norms of 
multiple communities – geographical, ethnic, national, and epistemic – 
become operative, scholars can gain a far more nuanced understanding 
of the international and transnational legal terrain. This is a world in 
which claims to coercive power, abstract notions of legitimacy, and argu-
ments about legal authority are only part of an ongoing conversation, 
not the fi nal determining factors. It is a world where “jurisgenerative” 
practices proliferate, creating opportunities for contestation and creative 
adaptation. 42 And though we may not like all the norms being articulated 
at any given moment, it will do no good to ignore them or insist on their 
lack of authority. In a hybrid world, law is an ongoing process of articu-
lation, adaptation, rearticulation, absorption, resistance, deployment, and 
on and on. It is a process that never ends, and scholars and policy makers 
would do well to study the multiplicity and engage in the conversation, 
rather than impose a top-down framework that cannot help but distort 
the astonishing variety on the ground. 
 
  42  See id. at 556, 596–9 (embracing international legal discourse as a space for “open pol-
itical confl ict and constant institutional revision”). 
